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Kemker: Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act

PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
HARRY KEMKER*

Florida is fast becoming one of the more important business areas
of the nation. As the state grows in commercial significance, businessmen and lawyers will be more frequently faced with the problems
of complying with the several statutes relating to price discrimination.
There is a surprising dearth of accurate knowledge of these statutes
in the business community. It is thought that it will be helpful to
analyze the price discrimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman
Act' in a general way, pointing up its terms and application, with
some comments on practical rules for the guidance of clients.
The Robinson-Patman Act is complex on its face and even more
difficult in application. Since a detailed discussion of all of its provisions would be prohibitive, this article will be limited to an
analysis of section 2 (a), which relates directly to the practice of giving
unlawful price discounts. The provisions of this section are the most
significant in terms of frequency of application, and an understanding
of them can furnish considerable insight into the theory of federal
regulation of price discrimination.
PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS

Before proceeding to discuss section 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman
Act it would be well to place this Act in the over-all context of the
federal anti-trust scheme, which consists of the Sherman Act, 2 the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 3 and the Clayton Act.4 The Robinson-Patman Act is section 2 of the Clayton Act.
The Sherman Act is a statute of great breadth of application.
Section 1 makes illegal "every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
. "5 Section 2 prohibits monopolization, attempts to monopolize,

*B.A. 1952, LL.B. 1954, Vanderbilt University; LL.M. in Trade Regulation
1955, New York University; member of Tennessee and Tampa, Florida, Bars.
1. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936). 15 U.S.C. §§13 (a), (b), 21(a) (Supp. I, 1959).
2. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§1-7 (1958).
3. 58 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§41-58 (1958).
4. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§12-27 (1958).
5. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §1 (1958). The various types of conduct that
are violative of §1 of the Sherman Act are legion. See generally 1954 TRADE REG.
REP. fff2000-41.
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or conspiracies to monopolize trade in any line of commerce. 6 Price
discrimination practices can constitute evidence of a violation of
section 2 7 of the Sherman Act and can, as such, be violations of
section 1 8 of the Act. Similarly, price discrimination is unlawful
under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits "unfair methods of competition in commerce." 9
Although the Robinson-Patman Act is the basic federal statute
dealing with price discrimination, it is not the only statutory basis
of anti-trust violation by price discrimination practices. An attorney
in evaluating a price discrimination problem should always review
the other federal and state'0 anti-trust acts in determining the position of his client.
THE JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT - INTERSTATE COMMERCE

The first question that is asked about the application of the
Robinson-Patman Act is its relation to interstate commerce and the
jurisdictional reach of the Act. Referring again to the several federal
anti-trust statutes, it should be noted that the Sherman Act has been
judicially determined to have been passed with the full exercise of
the commerce power by the Congress so that it touches matters of
local character when they can be said to affect commerce." For this
6. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §2 (1958). This section embraces three
distinct trade wrongs, all relative to control of a specific market. Conduct that
violates §1 of the Sherman Act is frequently evidence of violation of §2 of the Act.
See generally 1954 TRADE REG., REP. 112500-2610.
7. Schine Chain Theatres v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948); American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110
F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aft'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
8. United States v. New York Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626
(E.D. Ill. 1946), aft'd, 173 F.2d 79 (8th Cir. 1949). See consent decrees in the
following cases: United States v. Toy Guidance Council, TRADE REG. REP. (1957
Trade Cases) ff68,831, at 73,387 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 1957); United States v. National
Linen Serv. Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (1956 Trade Cases) ff68,398, at 71,700 (N.D.
Ga. June 28, 1956); United States v. Food Machinery and Chem. Corp., TRADE
REG. REP. (1954 Trade Cases) ff67,829, at 69,691 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 1954).
9. Cream of Wheat Co. v. FTC, 14 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1926); see generally
1958 TRADE REG. REP.ff5053.

10. The State of Florida has a price discrimination statute. FLA. STAT. ch. 540
(1959). It is a so-called geographical price discrimination statute analogous to
§3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13 (a) (Supp. I,
1959). This statute is of dubious value in eliminating injurious price discrimination. It cannot be enforced by private litigants, and there is little evidence of its
enforcement by the Attorney General of Florida.
11. United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954); Mandeville
Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948); United
States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
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reason there is virtually no business that can safely be determined to
be beyond the scope of the Sherman Act. Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, however, is limited by its terms to matters
that are in commerce. 12 This jurisdiction is more conservatively
drawn, and unless there is some movement in commerce involved
in the claimed "unfair method of competition," the Commission's
3
jurisdiction will not be sustained.'
Determination of the scope of commerce subject to the provisions
of the Robinson-Patman Act is difficult. First, it is clear that Congress
intended to regulate a very broad area of commerce and invoked
virtually its entire authority in passing the Act. 1 4 Section 1 of the

Clayton Act, 15 which defines commerce for the purposes of the Robinson-Patman Act, provides for regulation of interstate and foreign
commerce and commerce with the District of Columbia, insular
possessions, and other areas under the jurisdiction of the United
States. This is subject only to the limitation found in section 2 (a),
which does not extend that section's prohibitions to all types of
foreign commerce. 16
The crucial question is what discriminations within such "com7
merce" are prohibited by the Act. Section 2 (a) provides in part:'
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce,
in the course of such commerce. ... to discriminate in price
between different purchasers of commodities of like grade
and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in
such discrimination are in commerce ...

.

From this language it is clear that price discrimination is not covered
by the Act unless the seller is in "commerce" as defined by the Act,
and the sale to either the purchaser who receives the lower price or
to the purchaser who receives the higher price is a sale in the course
of the commerce in which the seller is engaged.18
12. 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §45 (1958).
13. FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941); California Rice Indus. v. FTC,
102 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1939); FTC v. F. A. Martoccio Co., 87 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 301 U.S. 691 (1937).
14. Alabama Independent Serv. Station Ass'n v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 28
F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Ala. 1939).
15. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §12 (1958).
16. Sec. 2 (a) applies only to commodities that are "sold for use, consumption,
or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of
Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the
United States .... " This provision excludes purchases by domestic exporters for
resale in foreign commerce.
17. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13 (a) (1952). (Emphasis supplied.)
18. The fact that the seller is generally engaged in interstate commerce is
immaterial; one of the sales must be a sale in commerce. Sun Cosmetic Shoppe
v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 81 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
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The courts have reached varied results in applying these commerce principles to specific fact situations, with the result that each
case must be carefully analyzed to determine the exact characteristics
of the sales involved. By its terms the Robinson-Patman Act does
not apply to price discrimination in sales to intrastate purchasers,
since it requires that one purchase be "in commerce." Discrimination in price by a seller in sales to intrastate purchasers of commodities produced within that state have been held not to be within the
Act. 19 Similarly, price discrimination in intrastate sales by a dealer
who purchased the commodities in interstate commerce has been
held to be without the scope of the Act. 20 However, sales from a
warehouse or terminal to intrastate purchasers of commodities which
the seller has brought to the warehouse or terminal in interstate
commerce have been held to be subject to the Act because they continued in the flow of interstate commerce to the purchasers notwithstanding the fact that they temporarily came to rest before being
sold to the intrastate purchasers.21
The foregoing rules generally support the conclusion that the
Robinson-Patman Act does not apply to sales that merely affect commerce. This conclusion is weakened, however, by the language of
section 2(a), which provides for the application of that section
"where either or any of the purchases involved are in interstate
commerce." The intent of this statutory language is well expressed in
the following excerpt from the Congressional Record: 22
"Where, however, a manufacturer sells to customers both
within the State and beyond the State, he may not favor either
to the disadvantage of the other; he may not use the privilege
of interstate commerce to the injury of his local trade, nor may
he favor his local trade to the injury of his interstate trade.
The Federal power to regulate interstate commerce is the
power both to limit its employment to the injury of business
within the State, and to protect interstate commerce itself from
injury by influences within the State."
The importance of the phrase either or any cannot be underestimated. It significantly increases the scope of section 2 (a). If a seller
19. Myers v. Shell Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
20. Spencer v. Sun Oil Co., 94 F. Supp. 408 (D. Conn. 1950); Lewis v. Shell
Oil Co., 50 F. Supp. 547 (N.D. Ill. 1943).

21. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951); Spencer v. Sun Oil Co.,
supra note 20; Midland Oil Co. v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 41 F. Supp. 436 (N.D. Ill.
1941); Alabama Independent Serv. Station Ass'n v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 28 F.
Supp. 386 (N.D. Ala. 1939). Contra: Lipson v. Socony Vacuum Corp., 87 F.2d

265 (1st Cir. 1937); Lewis v. Shell Oil Co., supra note 20.
22. 80 CONG. REc. 9417 (1936) (remarks of Congressman Utterback).
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lowers his price to an intrastate purchaser, his loss in giving this
lower price may be supported by a higher price on interstate sales.
Intrastate competitors of the seller may suffer competitive injury by
virtue of the lower price to the intrastate purchaser for whose business they compete. If its intrastate prices are discriminatory within
the meaning of section 2 (a), the seller has violated the Act 2 3
For the Act to apply, must the intrastate purchasers who receive
the lower price compete with the interstate purchasers who pay the
higher price? This question raises the problem of the three levels of
competition that the Robinson-Patman Act seeks to protect, which
will be specifically discussed subsequently in this article. If the
competition to be protected is between a seller and his intrastate
23. Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954). The plaintiff was
an intrastate seller of bakery products. The defendant sold bakery products in
intrastate and in interstate commerce but sold to purchasers in the plaintiff's
competitive area only in intrastate commerce. The defendant cut its price in
the plaintiff's competitive area but continued to charge higher prices in its interstate sales. The Court held that §2 (a) applied. Notwithstanding the fact that
the lower price was given in intrastate commerce, the Court reasoned that the
interstate business benefited from the local price cutting. If the Act were held
not to apply, interstate sellers could proceed to destroy local competitors by a
regular campaign of cutting intrastate prices; the losses incident to such campaigns would be funded by higher interstate prices.
This fact pattern is referred to as "geographical price discrimination"; it is
more specifically treated by §3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, which provides: "It
shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce .

.

. to sell . . . goods in any part of the United States at prices lower

than those exacted by said person elsewhere in the United States, for the purpose of
destroying competition, or eliminating a competitor in such part of the United
States or, to sell . . . goods at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor." 49 Stat. 1528 (1936), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §13(a) (Supp. I, 1959).
Despite the specific provisions of §3, the Court held that §2 (a) also applied
to geographical price discrimination under the facts of the case. It is now established that §3 provides only for criminal prosecutions and does not afford private
litigants a basis of suit. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958).
See also Bowman Dairy Co. v. Hedlin Dairy Co., 126 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Ill. 1954),
in which the court held that the doctrine of the Moore case applied to the converse of the facts in the Moore case. The defendant offered discriminatory prices,
gifts, and interest-free loans to induce the plaintiff's customers to deal with the
defendant. The defendant made no sales to interstate purchasers, but the plaintiff sold in interstate commerce. The court ruled that the Act applied. This
decision is of questionable validity. In Central Ice Cream Co. v. Golden Rod Ice
Cream Co., 257 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1958), both plaintiff and defendant purchased
raw materials in interstate commerce for the manufacture of ice cream. The
plaintiff sold its finished product to interstate purchasers, but the defendant sold
only to purchasers within the same state. However, much of the defendant's
production was sold within the state for use by purchasers in interstate commerce.
Despite the lack of true interstate sales, the court permitted the plaintiff's complaint to stand on the authority of the Moore case.
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competitors who suffer because of the seller's lower intrastate price,
it is generally held that the purchasers need not compete.2 1 On the
other hand, if the competition in issue is between purchasers rather
than sellers, then it is clear that the discriminatory prices must have
been charged in sales to competing purchasers.25
It is suggested that an attorney should exercise care before concluding that a client's sales practices are not subject to the RobinsonPatman Act for "commerce" reasons. The law is by no means settled,
and the discernible trend of the decisions seems to indicate that the
Act will be interpreted to cover more rather than less areas of commerce.
PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER SECTION 2 (a)
The Nature of the Offense
The regulation of discrimination in the price of goods and commodities sold, as distinguished from discrimination in the payment
for 2 6 or the granting of27 facilities or services to purchasers and discrimination in paying or receiving unlawful brokerage

fees, 28 is

24. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960); Moore v. Mead's Fine
Bread Co., supra note 23; Maryland Baking Co. v. FrC, 243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir.
1957); Atlas Bldg. Prod. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir.
1959).
25. Klein v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956); Naifeh v. Ronson Art
Metal Works, 218 F.2d 202 (10th Cir. 1954); Shaw's, Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 105
F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1939).
26. Sec. 2 (d) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay or contract for the payment of anything of value to or for the
benefit of a customer of such person in the course of such commerce as compensation or in consideration for any services or facilities furnished by or through
such customer in connection with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale
of any products or commodities manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by such
person unless such payment or consideration is available on proportionally equal
terms to all other customers competing in the distribution of such products or
commodities." 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13(d) (Supp. I, 1959). This section
seeks to eliminate discrimination in payment for facilities and services by requiring that such payments be made available to all competing customers "on
proportionately equal terms."
27. Sec. 2 (e) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate
in favor of one purchaser against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity
bought for resale, with or without processing, by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to the furnishing of, any service or facilities connected
with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of such commodity so
purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal
terms." 49 Stat. 1526 (1956), 15 U.S.C. §13 (e) (Supp. I, 1959). This section is a
corollary of §2 (d). It requires that services or facilities actually furnished be
accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms.
28. The unlawful brokerage provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act are contained in §2 (c): "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in
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covered by section 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman amendment to the
Clayton Act. The primary purpose of this section is to prohibit a
seller from giving a competitive advantage to one purchaser over
another. If purchaser A buys goods or commodities from seller X
at a cheaper unit price than purchaser B, A presumptively enjoys
a competitive advantage. It is the competitive disadvantage to B that
section 2 (a) seeks to eliminate. Section 2 (a) provides:29
"It shall be unlawful for any person ....

either directly or

indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers
of commodities of like grade and quality .... "
This provision requires a careful examination by way of definition
of terms. The word person as defined in section 1 of the Act covers
all forms of business enterprise3 0 The phrase to discriminate refers
simply to unequal prices, except that it implies the unavailability of
the lower price to purchasers paying the higher price. No notion
of unfairness in addition to unequal price is implied, nor should
discrimination be viewed from the point of placing the unequal
prices in a trade context to see if they in effect work a disadvantage
to the purchaser who receives the higher price. Section 2 (a) carries
its own definition of unfairness in terms of the injurious competitive effect of unequal prices.31 Discrimination as such is equated with
unequal prices.
The word commodities has been judicially defined to exclude
the course of such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything
of value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance
or discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered in connection with the
sale or purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise, either to the other party to such
transaction or to an agent, representative, or other intermediary therein where
such intermediary is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct
or indirect control, of any party to such transaction other than the person by
whom such compensation is so granted or paid." 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C.
§13(c) (Supp. I, 1959). This section is aimed at eliminating "false brokerage,"
that is, brokerage paid by a seller to a broker who is an agent of or connected
with the buyer, or, conversely, the payment of brokerage by a buyer to a broker
who is the agent of or connected with the seller. The prohibition is of both
paying and receiving unlawful brokerage.
29. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13 (a) (Supp. I, 1959).
30. Sec. 1 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §12 (1958), defines person as follows: "The word 'person' or 'persons' wherever used in this Act
shall be deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or
authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country."
31. This section requires a specific competitive effect of discriminatory pricing
in terms of injury to competition. See subheading "The Required Effect on
Competition," at note 45 infra. The United States Supreme Court, in FTC v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960), held that discrimination means no more
than a price difference.
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services. Transportation services have been held not subject to the
requirements of the old section 2 of the Clayton Act, 32 and decisions
under similar language of section 3 have excluded the business of
refilling acetylene gas tanks33 and the service of making loans. 4 However, contract terms providing for the servicing of commodities sold
may not alter the fact of sale so as to exclude price discrimination
in the sale from the provisions of section 2 (a).3 5 "Price" within the
meaning of section 2 (a) is the commonly accepted meaning of that
term in commercial circles. It invariably means the delivered price,
since delivery is necessary to complete the "sale" required by the section.36 The terms of sale as such are not required to be equal under
section 2 (a), but it is obvious that the terms of the sale may affect
price indirectly. If the prices quoted purchasers are the same but
the terms of sale offered are more favorable to one purchaser than
another, the seller may be charged with "indirect" price discrimina7
tion.a
When are commodities of "like grade and quality"? This is a
difficult question, for it is clear that minor variations in grade or
quality will be disregarded.3 8 For a seller to justify a price variation
on the theory that the commodities sold to one purchaser are not
identical with those sold to another, the variation must be real and
significant in terms of intrinsic quality or size. 39 Similarly, a seller
32. Fleetway, Inc. v. Public Serv. Interstate Transp. Co., 72 F.2d 761 (3d Cir.
1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 626 (1935).
33. Auto Acetylene Light Co. v. Prest-O-Lite Co., 276 Fed. 537 (6th Cir.
.1921).
34. United States v. Diversified Services, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 645 (D. Minn.
1951).
35. Carter Carburetor Corp. v. FTC, 112 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1940).
36. Sec. 2 (a) prohibits discrimination in price between different purchasers.
37. Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945); American Can Co. v.
Bruce's Juices, Inc., 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951).
38. McWhirter v. Monroe Calculating Mach. Co., 76 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Mo.

1948).
39. Package Closure Corp. v. Sealright Co., 141 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1944).
Differences in packaging in terms of size and quality of containers do not justify
a price difference when the commodities sold are of like grade and quality.
Luxor, Ltd., 31 F.T.C. 658 (1940). Varied packaging costs, however, are a permissible element for a cost justification defense.
If a seller adopts a price discount scale for its entire line without particularizing discounts on specific items, the "like grade and quality" requirement may
not be asserted by the seller by way of defense. In Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC,
238 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1956), the seller's price discrimination arose from a cumulative annual rebate plan based on the total dollar purchases by a given purchaser of a line of seller's goods consisting of many items. The discrimination
was held to result even if the items were not of like grade and quality; the
Commission ruled that the items were "sufficiently comparable for price regulation
by the statute."
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cannot avoid application of section 2 (a) on the basis of sales of
commodities with different brand names, trade names, or packaging.40
However, the cost saving to a seller of commodities that will bear
the purchaser's brand name is a legitimate factor for consideration in
a cost justification defense. Even if the items differ in size, discrimination can result if the prices are not relatively equal with respect to
size variations. 4 1 It should be added here that in defining "like grade
and quality" the cost justification defense has not as yet been considered. As a generalization for purposes of clarity at this point it
may be observed that price discrimination is not unlawful if the
lower price is justified by costs savings to the seller.
The term purchasers is also important, because there must be
sales to at least two actual purchasers from the same seller for a violation of the Act to be established. 42 No discrimination arises from
a purchase by one buyer from the seller and the seller's mere offer to
sell to another buyer at a different price,43 or from refusal to sell to
a former customer.4 4 The purchasers, however, need not be at the
same level of the distribution system. Discrimination can arise from
unequal prices in sales by a seller to a wholesaler and a retailer. If
a lower price is charged a retailer than that charged a wholesaler,
discrimination may result when the wholesaler's customers are competitors of the favored retailer. This is the so-called functional discount problem.
The Required Effect on Competition
Price discrimination per se is not unlawful under section 2 (a),
for the Act is violated only if the effect of the discrimination may
be substantially to: 45
40. See Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30 (1953); Hood Rubber Co.,
46 F.T.C. 1015 (1949); United States Rubber Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489 (1939).
41. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985 (S.D. Fla. 1949),
afJ'd, 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951).
42. Bairn & Blank v. Philco Corp., 148 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1957); United
States v. Borden Co., III F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ill. 1953).
43. Package Closure Corp. v. Sealright Co., 141 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1944); Shaw's,
Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 105 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1939).
44. Naifeh v. Ronson Art Metal Works, 218 F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1954); Chicago
Seating Co. v. S. Karpen 8: Bros., 177 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1949); Sorrentino v. GlenGery Shale Brick Corp., 46 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Pa. 1942). This conclusion as to
the legality of the refusal to deal is limited in significance by the requirement
of at least two actual sales for the purpose of §2 (a). There are certain instances
in which a refusal to deal may violate the anti-trust laws. 1954 TRADE REG. RE..
If2005.785-.813. See also the exclusive dealing provisions of §3 of the Clayton
Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §14 (1958), and discussion and decisions thereunder in 1958 TRADE REG. REP. 11f4000-09.
45. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13 (a) (Supp. I, 1959).
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(a) "lessen competition," or
(b) "tend to create a monopoly
in any line of commerce...."
The Act also provides that price discrimination is unlawful when
it has the effect to:46
"injure, destroy or prevent competition with any person" (a)
"who either grants" (b) "or knowingly receives the benefit of
such discrimination" or (c) "with the customers of either of
them."
These two quoted provisions may be distinguished in that the
first requires a significant market effect occasioned by price discrimination practices based on the words in any line of commerce. The
latter class of tests requires only an effect on an individual competitor. This part is highly important, since it affords protection to
every single purchaser and considerably broadens the scope of section
2 (a).
a. Effect on Market Generally
What is meant by "substantially to lessen competition"? The
cases construing this language have not been uniform. It is clear
that the word substantially does not mean trivial sporadic interference with competition. 47 A more difficult question is raised by
the words "where the effect of such discrimination may be," which
precede the phrase "substantially to lessen competition." It is clear
from these words that there is no requirement that the discrimination
shall have actually resulted in injury to competition.48 The United
States Supreme Court in FTC v. Morton Salt Co.40 held that there
must be only a "reasonable possibility" of injury to competition in
order to comply with the statutory language. This test supplanted
the earlier one that a "reasonable probability" must be shown. However, the courts have reverted to the "reasonable probability" test
since the Morton Salt case. 50
46. Ibid. It is dear that any one of the required competitive effects is sufficient
to make price discrimination unlawful. George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American
Can Co., 278 U.S. 245 (1929); Sydney Morris & Co. v. National Ass'n of Stationers,
40 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1930).
47. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir.

1951).
48. E. Edelman & Co. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 941 (1958); Whitaker Cable Corp. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957).
49. 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
50. In Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945), the Court required
a "reasonable probability," basing its decision on the earlier decision of Standard
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The words tend to create a monopoly furnish an alternative test
of necessary competitive effect; but this test has not been asserted
to the extent of the test of "substantially to lessen competition," with
the result that the phrase has not been developed fully by the courts.
Identical language under section 3 of the Clayton Act has been judicially determined to require only that it be shown that the trade
practices in question, if pursued, would permit the person carrying
out the practices to gain the power to control prices in, or to exclude
competition from, a specific relevant market or "line of commerce."5 1
The word tends obviously does not require the accomplished fact
of monopolization. The purpose of this language is to stop monopolies in their incipiency and to prevent their growth.
Under both the "substantial lessening of competition" and "tendency to create a monopoly" tests, there must be a "line of commerce" that is affected by the price discrimination. In anti-trust
parlance this phrase is usually referred to as the "relevant market."
There has been little judicial development of the phrase under
section 2 (a), but cases under section 3 of the Clayton Act define
"relevant market" as the geographical area outside which consumers,
for practical economic reasons, will not usually go to acquire the
same goods.52 Another aspect of the definition of "relevant market"
is the nature of the commodities or goods involved. Two or more
commodities or items of goods, though not identical, may be so
similar that a consumer might select one as an alternative to the
other.5 3 The relevant market will be said to include the goods or
commodities that are alternatives for purchasers.
Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922), which construed similar
provisions of §3 of the Clayton Act. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its position
as to §3 subsequent to its decision in the Morton Salt case. Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
Recent decisions requiring a "reasonable probability" are Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951); cf. Standard Motor Prod.,
Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1959); Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 238 F.2d
43 (8th Cir. 1956). Contra, Atlas Bldg. Prod. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co.,
269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1959).
51. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 81 Sup. Ct. 623 (1961); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Carter Carburetor Corp. v.
FTC, 112 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1940); Oxford Varnish Corp. v. Ault & Wioborg
Corp., 83 F.2d 764 (6th Cir. 1936). It is important to note that no specific percentage of control of the line of commerce is necessary; see Oxford Varnish case,
supra.
52. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., supra note 51; Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, supra note 50; Signode Steel Strapping Co. v. FTC, 132 F.2d 48
(4th Cir. 1942); see George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U.S.
245 (1929). See also 1954 TRADE REG. REP. ff2540 for cases defining "relevant
market" under §2 of the Sherman Act.
53. The relation of goods or commodities in terms of whether they are true
alternatives for purchasers is characterized by the phrase cross-elasticity of demand.
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The second test of injurious effect on competition is more complex. It makes price discrimination unlawful when the effect is to
injure, destroy, or prevent competition with (1) any person who
grants, or (2) any person who knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination, or (3) with the customers of either of them.
Thus there are three levels of competition that are protected: (1)
competition with the seller who grants the discrimination, or the
so-called primary line competition; (2) competition with the seller's
customers, or the so-called secondary line conpetition; and (3) competition with a purchaser from a person who purchases from the
seller, known as third line competition. At each of these levels the
word substantially is judicially added, so that the discrimination
must have the effect substantially to injure, destroy, or prevent competition.5- Likewise, the discrimination must entail a "reasonable
probability" of injury.55 Finally, it is required that the competitive
injury result from the discrimination in price and not merely from
the lower price charged the favored purchaser.O In short, there
must be a causal connection between discrimination and the injurious competitive effect.57
First Line Competition. A classic example of injury to competition with the seller is found in the situation in which a seller cuts
his prices in a specific geographical area to eliminate the competition
of a local competitor.5s In this case the seller's ability to quote the
lower price is cushioned by the higher prices it charges elsewhere.
The lower price can be discriminatory if it is less than its usual
price elsewhere and is not justified by cost savings or an attempt in
good faith to meet the equally low price of a competitor.59 A manuUnited States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours and Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
54. Whitaker Cable Corp. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 938 (1957); Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786
(7th Cir. 1951).
55. Whitaker Cable Corp. v. FTC, supra note 54; E. Edelman & Co. v. FTC,
239 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958); Moog Industries,
Inc. v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1956).
56. As between competing purchasers (second level competition), injury clearly
results from price differences. See cases cited note 25 supra.
57. In primary level competition cases this connection is furnished by the
fact that higher prices to some purchasers pay for or fund the seller's lower
prices. See cases cited notes 23, 24 supra.
58. See notes 23, 24, 57 supra.
59. If a seller simply meets the price of a local competitor, his price may be
discriminatory if his product is of higher quality or has better public acceptance
and normally sells at a higher price. Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v.
American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1929); Gerber Prod. Co. v. Beech-Nut
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facturer may lawfully sell both to wholesalers and retailers in the
same trade territory without granting a wholesaler a price low
enough to permit the wholesaler retail purchases.'
Secondaiy Line. The most frequent instance of injury to competition by price discrimination is the injury to a purchaser who
suffers because competing purchasers acquire goods of like grade and
quality from a seller at a lower price than that given the injured
customer. The discriminatory price must be judged in context to
determine whether it has had the effect of substantially injuring,
destroying, or preventing competition. In advising his client it cannot be safely assumed by the practitioner that the unlawful price
discrimination on one item out of hundreds sold by the seller will
be free from the Act because of the "substantiality" test.6 The effect
of price discrimination on competition is the test, and a seller cannot maintain that the discrimination is insignificant because the item
2
is but one of many sold by him.
The Third Level. If sales are made to a wholesaler and a retailer in the same trade territory and the wholesaler is granted a far
greater discount than that afforded the retailer, other retailers who
purchase from the wholesaler may gain an advantage in competing
with the first retailer. It is not unlawful to give the wholesaler a
substantial discount or a favored price simply because he is a wholesaler, since the price can be justified by the function performed by
Life Savers, 160 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Practices of selling to large accounts
at so low a price that smaller competitors cannot compete or new competitors
cannot enter the market would have the same effect. Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v.
FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945); Midland Oil Ref. Co. v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 41
F. Supp. 436 (N.D. III. 1941).
Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956), is an important case. The mere fact that a seller
sells at a lower price in one market than in another creates no presumption of
unlawful price discrimination. There was no proof of a plan to injure competition or of any price discrimination between purchasers in the local market in
which the seller offered its lower price, and no causal connection existed between
the higher prices in other states and any damage suffered by local competitors.
The court found no violation of §2 (a). This case should be carefully reviewed
in any analysis of a primary line case. The opinion also announces the rule
that intent to injure competition is not required for a violation of §2 (a).
60. Klein v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956); A. J. Goodman & Son
v. United Lacquer Corp., 81 F. Supp. 890 (D. Mass. 1949). But the seller's price
to retailers should not be substantially lower than that to wholesalers. Krug v.
International Tel. 8- Tel. Corp., 142 F. Supp. 230 (D.N.J. 1956).
61. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948); H. C. Brill Co., 26 F.T.C.
666 (1938).
62. A price advantage on one item can easily result in a general competitive
advantage to a seller.
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the wholesaler. Thus, if the wholesaler carries on such services as
distribution, advertising, warehousing, breaking down shipments for
delivery in smaller quantities, sales solicitation, credit risks, and the
like, the wholesaler may in effect perform a function beneficial to
the seller which the seller must assume in dealing with a retailer. The
savings derived from the wholesaler's assumption of such functions
may justify the discount. The Robinson-Patman Act does not approve or disapprove of such discounts to wholesalers but requires
that they be justified in terms of savings to the seller.G3 These functional discounts are subject to the same test of unlawfulness as any
other price quoted. Thus it is not necessary that prices be uniform
if the wholesaler fulfills a valid function and the lower price is reflected in a cost savings to the seller, who would otherwise have to
perform this function.
Defenses
The most meaningful defenses available to persons charged with
illegal price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act are the
"cost justification defense," found in section 2 (a), and the "meeting
competition defense," contained in section 2 (b). Less important are
the provisions of section 2 (a) affirmatively stating that any seller is
permitted to deal or not to deal with customers of his choice and
permitting price changes from time to time as the result of imminent deterioration of perishable goods, obsolescence of seasonal goods,
64
distress sales, and the like.
Cost Justification. Section 2 (a) provides in part:6G
"That nothing contained [herein] shall prevent differentials
which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of
manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing
methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such
purchasers sold or delivered .... "
A purchaser's relationship with the seller may
teristics that result in a saving to the seller in
doing business with the particular purchaser.
a seller is able to sell to a particular purchaser
is required to sell to another purchaser the
savings on to the purchaser by a lower price

have certain characterms of the cost of
To the extent that
at less expense than
seller may pass the
or a discount. This

63. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952); Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 176 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1949). See also cases cited note 60 supra.
64. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §13 (a) (Supp. I, 1959). Subject
to certain limitations, a seller may refuse to deal with a purchaser for any reason.
See note 44 supra.
65. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §13 (a) (Supp. I, 1959).
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statute provides that the seller may grant "only due allowance" for
the cost savings enjoyed by him. Most important is the fact that
the seller has the burden of affirmatively establishing the cost justification.
The statute does not require the seller to pass the cost savings on
to the purchasers, for the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits only the
granting of a discount or a lower price in excess of cost savings6G
Therefore, the seller may pass on in whole or in part the cost savings
67
he enjoys by dealing with a particular purchaser.
What elements of cost may the seller consider in attempting to
justify a price differential?8 It is clear from the statute that cost
savings may be the basis of justification only to the extent that they
are realized from differing methods or quantities of sale or delivery.
Consequently, differences in manufacturing costs resulting from variations in the cost of raw materials or labor do not justify a varied
sales price, but seasonal or fluctuating aspects of the purchaser's
needs may be considered. 69 A justification for the price differential
may arise if a purchaser places orders far enough in advance of delivery for the manufacturer to adjust distribution costs favorably.7o
Similarly, demands by a purchaser for immediate deliveries may entail higher costs for the manufacturer. If a manufacturer has a consistent inventory, variations in customer demands may not serve to
justify a lower price. This leads to the basic observation that distribution cost savings rather than manufacturing cost savings give
rise to justification of a price differential.
A detailed analysis of the elements of costs is beyond the scope
66. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
67. However, the phrase only due allowance has been given a literal meaning
of none other than full allowance. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948);
FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945). These cases deal with socalled delivered pricing and, generally speaking, require that purchaser A be given,
in terms of price, the competitive advantage in terms of delivery cost that he
enjoys by being geographically closer to the seller than purchaser B. This is an
oversimplification of a very complex problem.
68. Close attention should be given this question, since the cost justification
defense may be readily rejected. See cases enumerated in 1958 TRADE Rc.
REP.
13510.575.
69. "Such a difference cannot be claimed on the basis of a difference in cost
in the seller's entire business with and without the purchases of the customer in
question. If his purchases so increase the seller's volume as to make possible a
reduction in unit cost upon his entire business, other customers are entitled
to share also in the benefit of that reduction." 80 CONG. REc. 9417 (1936).
70. This is a borderline case. The advantage of advance knowledge of consumer demand may result in delivery cost savings in terms of warehousing costs,
transportation schedules, and the like, but this should not necessarily be considered to include the cost advantage of the seller's being able to accomplish
savings by more efficient production scheduling.
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of this article. The obvious elements are the costs involved in packaging, delivery, warehousing, customer relationships, advertising, and
overhead costs. As a note of caution, it must be recalled that the
costs are limited by statute to those involved in sales and delivery.
Each case must be analyzed to determine whether a particular item
of cost is properly included, and it must then be demonstrated that
the cost savings are actually enjoyed by the seller in his relationship
with the favored purchaser.
By way of prudence, an attorney should suggest to a client falling
within the purview of this act the adoption of cost accounting practices that will justify discounts granted by the client. This is not
always accomplished easily, but some study should be made to justify
his discount scale. The cost factors justifying the discounts should
be practical and real and not illusory theoretical accounting. The
fact that the seller believes that he is enjoying a particular cost saving because of certain aspects of dealing with a favorite purchaser does
not mean that he enjoys a cost justification defense. The arbitrary
allocation of cost in the internal accounting procedures of a seller
does not mean that there is an actual cost saving, for it may be found
1
invalid.7
Perhaps the most common misconception by the lay public and
lawyers alike is the idea that quantity discounts are always lawful.
A quantity discount is nothing more than a lower price based on
volume. Like any other price saving, it must be fully justified. Quantity discounts are not per se lawful merely because the seller seeks to
give them.
Meeting the Equally Low Price of a Competitor. Section 2 (b)
72
provides:
"Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint
under this section, that there has been discrimination in price
....
the burden of rebutting the prima facie case thus made
by showing justification shall be upon the person charged with
the violation of this section, and unless justification shall be
affirmatively shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an
order terminating the discriminations: Provided, however, that
nothing [herein contained] shall prevent a seller rebutting the
prima facie case thus made by showing that his lower price ...
to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet
an equally low price of a competitor . .. ."
71. See note 68 supra. The trend, however, is away from requiring cost
justification to the last penny. See American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co.,
191 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1951).
72. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §13(b) (Supp. I, 1959).
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On its face this section does not seem to deal with proceedings other
than those before the Federal Trade Commission. It is obvious, however, that the provisions of section 2 (b) are intended to apply to civil
actions for damages by persons injured.The first step in analyzing this section is to determine its value
as a defense. In Standard Oil Co. v. FTCT, the United States Supreme

Court was faced with the question whether the meeting of an equally
low price of a competitor constitutes a complete defense to a price
discrimination charge under section 2 (a). The FTC argued that
section 2 (b) simply provides for rebuttal of the prima facie case of
price discrimination and that the "meeting competition" defense is
not a complete defense. The Court held, however, that a showing
that a seller has in good faith met the equally low price of a competitor does constitute a complete defense.
There are many problems in the application of this defense.
What if the equally low price met by the seller is unlawful under
the terms of section 2 (a)? For example, if the seller defends by
saying that he is meeting the equally low price of another seller, even
though he knows that the seller's price is discriminatory and not
subject to a cost justification defense, is this adequate to defeat the
charges? The answer is not entirely clear, but it is obviously an unreasonable burden upon the seller to require him to ascertain in
advance that the competing price is a lawful one. The decisions make
it fairly clear that unless the seller in fact knows that the competing
price is unlawful it constitutes a defense to meet that price, lawful
or not.75 The question is whether the seller acted in "good faith"
in meeting the price.
The Federal Trade Commission has not been particularly hospitable to the "meeting competition" defense. A seller cannot engage
in a general price cutting program in order to meet the general
competition of the competitor but can meet competition only in
individual competitive situations. There can be, therefore, no general system of price cutting on the part of the competitor to meet
the general system of lower prices on the part of another competitor.6
73. Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956); General Shale Prod. Corp. v. Struck Constr. Co.,
132 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 780 (1943).
74. 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
75. In the Standard Oil case the Court held that it was a complete defense
to meet the lawful and equally low price of a competitor. In Standard Oil Co.
v. Brown, 238 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1956), and Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms
Co., supra note 73, each court refused to place the burden on the defendant to
show that it met a lawful price.
76. Standard Motor Prod. Co. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1959); E. Edelman 8- Co. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941

(1958).
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It is clear that the requirement of good faith in meeting the price
of a competitor contemplates that the seller's goods are of the same
kind and quality as those sold by his competitor. Thus if a competitor's goods usually sell at a lower price because of differences in
grade, packaging, consumer acceptance, and the like, it is not necessarily good faith to meet the competitor's price. 77 This defense also
requires that the price be based on the same quantities purchased.78
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of the application of section 2 (b)
is the clear rule that meeting the competitive price of another does
not permit a seller to exceed this price.79 In this regard section 2 (b)
has been considered to be defensive rather than aggressive, implying
the idea that the defense is recognized only for the purpose of retaining a customer.80 It has been stated that even if the seller merely
meets the price and does not exceed it, aggressive conduct may be
implied and the defense disallowed when new business is obtained
thereby.8 ' This approach is obviously not in keeping with the realities
of the business community, but it can only be suggested that when
a seller exceeds in meeting the price of a competitor and thereby
acquires the customers of a competitor, he runs the risk of failure of
his section 2 (b) defense.
INDUCING OR RECEIVING DISCRINIINATORY PRICES

Section 2 (f) of the Robinson-Patman Act provides that "it shall
be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in
price which is prohibited by this section." This section prohibits a
purchaser from knowingly inducing or receiving an unlawful price
discrimination.2 It requires that the purchaser be engaged in commerce and that the discriminatory price relate to a purchase in commerce. It also requires that the price paid be in all particulars discriminatory under section 2 (a).83 In addition, this section is not violated unless the purchaser knew or was reasonably put on notice that
77. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960); Porto Rican American
Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1929); Gerber Prod.
Co. v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, 160 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
78. FTC v. Standard Brands, Inc., 189 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1951).
79. Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945).
80. If the seller grants a price concession in advance of or without knowledge
of a competitor's lower price, it has not met the competitor's price. MinneapolisHoneywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951).
81. FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945); Standard Motor Prod.,
Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1959).
82. The term induce is of little significance, because the section requires a
completed sale.
83. There must be a discrimination in price that is prohibited by this section.
This requires the price to be unlawful under §2 (a).
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he was receiving from the seller a price lower than the price to other
purchasers, and that there was no defense available to the seller to
84
justify the lower price.
REMEDIES -

PROOF OF VIOLATIONS

Violations of section 2 (a) may subject the violator to proceedings
by the Government and by private litigants. The Federal Trade
Commission is specifically given jurisdiction to enforce this provision
by section 1185 of the Clayton Act. Proceedings before the Commission are administrative in character s and may result in a cease
and desist order or a fine in the nature of a civil penalty if the order
is violated. 7 Private litigants may recover triple damages for injury
occasioned them by violation of section 2 (a)ss and may obtain an
injunction to restrain the injurious practices.8 9
What are the requirements for establishing a violation of section
2 (a)? By way of summary, and at the risk of overgeneralization, it
is suggested that proof of a discrimination requires the following
elements:
84. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
85. 38 Stat. 734 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §21 (a) (Supp. I, 1959).
86. See §5 of the FTC Act, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §45 (1958).
87. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §45, with reference to cease and desist
orders and §11 (1) of the Clayton Act, 73 Stat. 243 (1959), 15 U.S.C. §21 (1) (Supp. I,
1959), with reference to violation of orders. There is also a statutory provision
empowering federal district attorneys to institute injunction proceedings in
the various federal district courts to enjoin violations of the Clayton Act. 38
Stat. 736, 15 U.S.C. §25 (1958).
88. Sec. 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. §15 (1958), provides:
"Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of
the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or
has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
There is also a provision authorizing suit by the United States for injury to
its business or property by virtue of violations of the Act: "Whenever the United
States is hereafter injured in its business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws it may sue therefor in the United States district court
for the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without
respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover actual damages by it
sustained and the cost of suit." 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. §15 (a) (1958).
89. See §16 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §26 (1958). There
is also a provision for the use of final decrees or judgments finding a violation
of the Act as evidence in proceedings under the Clayton Act brought by any other
party. It has the effect of prima facie evidence in the second action of matters
concluded in the first. See §5(a) of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §16 (1958).
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1. There must be a discrimination between two or more customers of a single seller.9°
2. The difference in price must be made in connection with
commodities of like grade and quality.
3. One of the purchases involved must be in interstate commerce.
4. The commodities involved must have been sold for use,
consumption, or resale within the United States or its territories
or insular possessions, and not for purposes of export.
5. The transaction must involve the sale of commodities and
not the sale of services.
6. A discrimination is not unlawful unless it has one or more
of the following effects on competition:
(a) substantially lessens competition in any line of commerce,
(b) tends to create a monopoly in any line of commerce,
(c) substantially injures, destroys, or prevents competition
(1) with the person who grants the discrimination,
(2) with or among any direct purchasers from the
seller,
(3) with or among any of the customers who buy from
the direct purchasers from the seller,
(4) with the person who knowingly receives the discrimination.
Once these requisites have been established, the Commissioner or
the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, and justification of
the violation is placed upon the opposing party. The burden of
proof, as prescribed in section 2 (b),91 is declaratory of the general
evidentiary rule as to the burden of proving statutory exemptions.
The justification must be "affirmatively shown," and affirmative establishment of the justification is an expensive and difficult undertaking.
CONCLUSION

Although this article does little more than explore the surface of
section 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, it is hoped that it affords
some insight into the important and serious problems raised by the
section. The significance of this statute for the business community
cannot be overestimated, for nothing could be more basic to competition than price. While businessmen are not confronted with anti90. The time interval between sales must be reasonable. See Atlanta Trading
Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958).
91. 49 Stat. 1926 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13 (b) (Supp. I, 1959).
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trust violations with the regularity with which they face problems
in the fields of taxation, labor, and other regulated fields, the impact
of an anti-trust suit can be of far greater magnitude than any other
legal problem encountered by a businessman. A section 2 (a) suit may
strike at the most important aspect of his business - his sales.
A Federal Trade Commission proceeding can produce a considerable loss of time for executives, cause disruption of sales activities,
and result in significant legal costs. More important, however, is
the fact that a violation may occasion a triple damage suit. Judgments in suits of this nature have frequently been of such magnitude
as to destroy a medium-sized business. The attorney can often prevent violations by a detailed analysis of the client's sales procedures.
Section 2 (a) is a legal mandate that competitors and purchasers
are entitled to be free from the injurious competitive effect of unlawful price discrimination. Although many businessmen insist that
price favoritism is the only way in which they can carry on their
business, the Robinson-Patman Act by its very existence tells them
that Congress has struck a balance between their problems and the
value to the public of maintaining competition. It is submitted
that the Robinson-Patman Act is a significant and important facet of
business counseling for all lawyers.
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